On 11 December 2005, a vapour cloud was released by an overfilled storage tank at a Hertfordshire, England fuel depot, and then ignited, causing fires and explosions in and around the area. Although no-one was killed, the Buncefield disaster forced residents of 2,000 homes and 600 businesses to evacuate, according to the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), as well as wreaking widespread environmental damage.

In the aftermath of the event, the subsequent major investigation led by the HSE and the Environment Agency found systematic failings in tank level monitoring, overfill prevention and safety management systems. Weak oversight and inadequate controls allowed large quantities of petrol to overflow undetected, leading to the release of a vapour cloud that ignited with catastrophic force, the HSE said. As a result, five companies were prosecuted under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and convicted and fined almost £10mn.

In a press release published to mark the anniversary, Sarah Albon, Chief Executive of the HSE, said: ‘Twenty years on from Buncefield, we remember not only the scale of the incident but also the determination shown by everyone involved to learn from what happened and drive lasting change.  

‘Buncefield demonstrated that when we face serious challenges head-on with transparency and commitment to improvement, we can fundamentally change how major hazards are managed.’

Ken Rivers, HSE Board Member, said: ‘Buncefield has led to profound changes not just in the operational, technical and regulatory aspects of managing major hazards but also in leadership, and the way industry and regulator work together in the UK.

‘It led industry to becoming more self-disciplined, taking ownership, and it led to a more mature and collaborative relationship with the regulator.’

In the press release, the HSE identified three groups in particular which reviewed and improved safety in the aftermath of the event. First was the joint industry-regulator-trade union Buncefield Standards Task Group, which developed stronger standards for fuel storage and transfer operations. Second was the Major Incident Investigation Board, which identified root causes and made recommendations about reforms to safety leadership, management systems and emergency planning. The third was the Process Safety Leadership Group, which published a report in 2009 with new standards for overfill prevention, automatic shutdown, secondary containment and process safety management.

The Energy Institute contributed to that report through its work on human and organisational factors, and in other ways to strengthen leadership, human and organisational factors, and technical standards at fuel storage sites.  

In addition, lessons from Buncefield and other incidents are embedded across EI guidance, including EI 3002 and EI 3019, and in supporting publications on loss of containment, secondary and tertiary containment, and bund and tank integrity.  

The work continues. In 2009, the Process Safety Leadership Group published new standards. In 2019, the UK oil and gas industry set out eight principles of process safety leadership ‘fundamental to the successful management of a major hazard industry.’  

‘The message is about the need for continual leadership vigilance to prevent major accidents, including knowing what can go wrong, and the condition of measures to prevent or recover from major accidents,’ said Mark Scanlon, Energy Institute Head of HSE.